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Abstract
The sources of “total factor productivity (TFP) growth” or the “Solow residual” typically remain un-
known as a residual. This paper aims to identify the underlying sources of this residual growth, being explicit
about micro underpinnings and transitional growth from occupation choices of heterogeneous agents and ﬁ-
nancial deepening in use of both macro and micro data. We develop a method of growth accounting that
decomposes not only the overall growth but also the residual TFP growth into four components: occupa-
tional shifts, ﬁnancial deepening, capital heterogeneity, and sectoral Solow residuals. Applying this method
to Thailand, which experienced rapid growth with enormous structural changes for the two decades between
1976 and 1996, we ﬁnd that 55 percent of TFP growth can be explained on average by occupational shifts
and ﬁnancial deepening, without presuming exogenous technical progress. Expansion of credit is a major
part of this explained TFP growth. Decomposition of the simulation helps us to infer that for the remainder
TFP growth, capital-heterogeneity eﬀect is behind during the initial period (1976-1980) while sectoral Solow
residuals, due to the surge of wage after 1986, is behind during the latter decade (1986-1996).
JEL Classiﬁc a t i o n :O 4 7 ,O 1 6 ,J 2 4 ,D 3 1 .
Keywords: Total Factor Productivity, Occupation Choice, Capital Heterogeneity, Financial Deepening
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Total factor productivity (TFP) growth is measured as a residual, total output growth less the weighted sum
of input growth. It is also called the “Solow residual.” By deﬁnition, this residual growth measures the
improvement of productivity in a Hicks-neutral aggregate production function. However, the improvement of
aggregate eﬃciency measured in this way can come from various sources, which typically remain unknown inside
the residual. As Abramovitz (1956) puts it, the Solow residual represents a “measure of our ignorance” of growth
process.
This paper aims to identify the underlying sources of the residual growth via an integrated use of models
and data. We use a growth model that makes explicit its micro underpinnings, namely occupation choices and
limited access to credit, and features transition, and we then propose a growth accounting method based on
the model. This allows us to decompose not only the total output growth into the factor accumulation and the
TFP growth but also to further decompose the TFP growth into its underlying sources, combining micro data
with macro data. The growth accounting method is applied to Thailand, where rapid economic growth was
accompanied by enormous structural changes for the two decades between 1976 and 1996. From the theory-data
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1nexus and micro-macro data synthesis, we ﬁnd various sources of TFP growth, in particular the importance of
ﬁnancial deepening.
Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) suggest that careful measurement and correct model speciﬁcation would
weed out the “errors,” i.e., the “measure of our ignorance.” Their accompanied empirical work successfully
showed that careful measurement of education and capital utilization curtails the size of the residual. Still,
although smaller, the residual turned out to remain the major part.1 Most of the subsequent empirical work
focuses on careful measurement of input variables (mainly by reﬁning the concept of capital) rather than on
correct model speciﬁcation, and this continues to conﬁrm the substantial size of the residual in most countries.2
Klenow and Rodr´ iguez-Clare (1997) and Prescott (1998) succinctly argue that it is TFP rather than capital
that determines the levels and changes in international income diﬀerences even if the concept of capital is
broadened to include intangible capital such as human capital and organization capital. From the series of
depression studies for nine advanced countries, and a study for U.S. by Cole and Ohanian (1999), Kehoe and
Prescott (2002) conclude that the changes in TFP are crucial also in accounting for the within-country business
ﬂuctuation.3
The basis of these studies is the neoclassical growth model built on an aggregate production function
with exogenous technical change. Solow (1957) himself emphasized that he used the phrase “technical change”
for any kinds of shift in the production function. In particular, when an economy is engaged in a structural
transformation, compositional changes among sectors or activities, across which productivity levels diﬀer on the
extensive margins, would not only contribute to output growth but also to productivity growth without any
true technical change. The documentation of the empirical importance of the structural change on economic
growth dates at least back to Clark (1940) and Kuznets (1957). The emphasis on the theoretical importance of
transition in understanding the true dynamics of growth and development was made early by Hicks (1965) and
Schultz (1990), and recently reaﬃrmed by Lucas (2002).4 Hansen and Prescott (2002), and Gollin, Parente, and
Rogerson (2001) illustrate that incorporating structural transformation helps to explain the long term growth
path and evolution of the international diﬀerences in per capita income. However, these models are again built
on exogenous technical progress at the sectoral level, and the aggregate residual is simply decomposed into
1The portion of the residual for the U.S. growth during the 1950-1962 period went down to 54%, which is a much smaller number
than the original estimates, 86% by Abramovitz (1956), or 88% by Solow (1957). But it is still the major source. In fact, Jorgenson
and Griliches (1967) reduced to the portion to 5% in their original paper, but corrected to 54% upon the criticism of Denison (1969)
on their excessively wide adjustment in capital utilization.
2See Griliches (2000) and Hulten (2001) for excellent summaries of the empirical history of the residual.
3The nine coutries include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and the U.K. in the interwar period, and Argentina, Chile, and
Mexico in the 1980’s, and Japan in the 1990’s. France, Italy, and the U.K are exceptional examples. See the 2002 special volume
of Review of Economic Dynamics V. 5, No. 1, for details.
4Hicks (1965) argues that the speed of convergence does matter in order to consider the balanced-growth-path as a valid
description of actual growth path. Schultz (1990) emphasizes the importance of the process of restoring equilibria in transition in
the course of economic growth. Lucas (2002) asserts that “a useful theory of economic development will necessarily be a theory of
transition.”
2sectoral residuals.
The fundamental idea of Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) is that productivity growth should be explained
rather than just measured, and both measurement and theory are crucial in doing so. Some existing studies
such as the depression studies in Kehoe and Prescott (2002) indeed pursue a tight link between the theory and
the data, as we do in this paper. They do successfully identify the importance of the TFP itself. However,
regarding the identiﬁcation of the sources of the TFP growth, they either direct the reader to future research or
postulate policy-oriented conjectures based on informed guess. As Kehoe and Prescott (2002) conclude, “absent
careful micro studies at ﬁrm and industry levels, we can only conjecture as to what these policies are,” calling
for micro evidence. In this paper, we are explicit about the micro underpinnings of the growth model, and we
attempt not only to integrate the model and the data, b u ta l s ot ou s eb o t ht h em i c r od a t aa n dt h em a c r od a t a
in a synthetic way to ﬁll this gap.
We consider a growth model that has two diﬀerent kinds of technology, traditional and modern. This has
deep roots in the development literature such as in Lewis (1954) and Ranis and Fei (1961). Only the modern
technology uses hired labor and capital while the traditional technology provides ﬁxed subsistence income using
self-employed labor alone. The occupational choices and the accompanied choice of technology are based on
presumed diﬀerentials in entrepreneurial talents in the population. However, for agents who do not have access
to credit, occupational choices are subject to an additional constraint, individual wealth, as in Lloyd-Ellis and
Bernhardt (2000) and Banerjee and Newman (1993). In contrast, occupational choices in the ﬁnancial sector
depend only on the talent. In sum, the technological blue prints are commonly available to everyone, but
only subset of agents adopt the modern technology due to the two kinds of heterogeneity, i.e., wealth and
talent. In this model, productivity depends on eﬃciency in allocation of the talent and the capital, both of
which improve as the ﬁnancial sector expands. Speciﬁcally, the expansion aﬀects the occupational choice in the
entire population (extensive margin) and also the eﬃciency of using capital among the entrepreneurs (intensive
margin).
We intentionally shut down all exogenous technological change, the typical engine of productivity growth
in the existing TFP literature. Thus, productivity growth cannot come from technical change but only from
improving allocation eﬃciency, which depends on ﬁnancial deepening. This is not because we think technical
change is unimportant, but rather we would like to see how well the alternative hypothesis based on occupational
transition and ﬁnancial deepening can explain the actual growth of output and TFP.
The relationship between ﬁnancial development and economic growth was postulated early by Schumpeter
(1911) and its empirical patterns were addressed early also by Goldsmith (1969) and McKinnon (1973). Recent
theoretical underpinnings of the relationship have been developed, e.g., by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990),
and Bencivenga and Smith (1991) and recent empirical evidence has been provided by Townsend (1983), King
3and Levine (1993) and Levine and Zervos (1998) using cross-country data, and by Rajan and Zingales (1998)
using the industry-level data across countries. In particular, Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) ﬁnd that the
positive eﬀect of ﬁnancial intermediation on GDP growth is through its impact on TFP growth rather than
through its impact on physical capital accumulation and private savings rates. None of them, however, bring a
structural model to the data. Our integrated use of the model and the data provides more direct evidence on
the ﬁnance-growth relationship.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model economy. Section 3 reviews and further
develops a method of growth accounting, explaining how the residual TFP growth can be further decomposed. In
Section 4, the data sources are described and standard growth accounting is done. In Section 5, the Thai data are
brought into to calibrate the model. We simulate the Thai economy from the model, and the simulated economy
is decomposed following the growth accounting method of Section 3. Sensitivity analysis is also conducted. In
S e c t i o n6 ,w eb r i n gt h em o d e lb a c kt ot h em i c r od a t aa n dd e c o m p o s et h ea c t u a lT h a iT F Pg r o w t h .W et h u s
combine our results with those from the macro growth accounting to identify the sources and patterns of the
economic growth in Thailand. Section 7 concludes.
2M o d e l
We consider a model of wealth-constrained occupation choice as in Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (LEB) (2000),
but allow a credit market for a limited group of agents. The economy is populated by a continuum of agents
with measure one evolving over discrete time t =0 ,1,2.... An agent i with end-of-period wealth Wit at date






subject to the budget constraint cit + bi,t+1 = Wit.5 Each agent is endowed with a single unit of time.
There are two kinds of production technology, traditional and modern. In traditional technology, everyone
earns a subsistence return γ of the single consumption good. In modern technology, entrepreneurs hire capital kt
5This Cobb-Douglas form of preferences implies a linear rule of savings behavior, which simpliﬁes the dynamics of the model.









t + σltkt. (1)
Thus, there are two occupations (entrepreneurs and wageworkers) in modern technology and only one occupation
(self-employed subsisters) in traditional technology. The single unit of time is inelastically supplied to the
devoted occupation he chooses, which determines individual income: proﬁts for modern entrepreneurs, wages
for wageworkers, and the subsistence return for traditional self-employed.
There exists an initial setup cost xit to start up a business, which represents the inverse of the innate
entrepreneurial talent of each agent. This is assumed to be independent of the initial wealth level bit and
randomly drawn from a time-invariant i.i.d. uniform distribution over a unit interval [0,1]
H(xit)=xit.
In this model, an agent i is distinguished by a pair of beginning-of-period characteristics: initial wealth bi
and randomly drawn entrepreneurial (lack of) talent xi. (Hereafter, due to the recurrent nature of the model,
the time subscript is tuned oﬀ unless it is necessary to make it explicit.) With the above utility function,
the optimal rules for consumption and saving are linear functions of wealth, and so preference maximization
is equivalent to end-of-period wealth maximization. Thus, given equilibrium prices, the wage w and the gross
interest (or shadow price for storage) r, an agent of type (bi,x i) chooses his occupation to maximize his total
wealth Wi:
Wi = γ + rbi for traditional subsisters, (2)
= w + rbi for wage laborers,
= π(bi,x i,w)+rbi, for entrepreneurs,
where
π(bi,x i,w)=m a x
ki,li
{f(ki,l i) − wli − rki − xi} (3)
Equation (2) suggests that there is a reservation wage level w = γ below which every potential wageworker
prefers to remain in traditional technology. Likewise, if the wage rate exceeds that reservation wage, no one
6The conventional speciﬁcation of technology for neoclassical growth models is Cobb-Douglas, which imposes unit elasticity of
substitution between factors, and hence constant factor shares, regardless of the level of input. Although there are some empirical
studies justifying the constant factor shares at aggregate level, it is only roughly true. It is technology rather than preferences that
puts important restrictions on the TFP analysis. The quadratic technology adopted here is more ﬂexible than the Cobb-Douglas
technology, allowing time-varying factor shares and imposing no restriction on returns to scale, and is one of the most parsimonious
general speciﬁcations with two production factors.
In speciﬁc, Fuss, McFadden, and Mundlak (1978) show that the required number of parameters to represent a technology in
the absence of homogeneity restrictions with n f a c t o r si s( n +1 ) ( n +2 ) /2, and generalized Leontief, translog, and quadratic forms
satisfy this requirement. With dichotomous factors, capital and labor, we need six parameters. Here, we normalize the constant
parameter of the quadratic form as zero, which does not matter for growth accounting.
5remains in traditional technology. Therefore, when the traditional technology coexists with the modern technol-
ogy, the equilibrium wage is tied to the subsistence income γ, and the population proportions of wage earners
and subsistence self-employed are determined only by the demand for labor from the modern technology. This
resembles the feature of Lewis’s (1954) well-known model of unlimited labor supply in a dual economy. The
equilibrium wage starts to grow, being determined by marginal productivity of labor, after some critical point,
as Ranis and Fei (1961) call it a “commercialization point.”
Suppose now as in LEB that there is a ﬁrst sector with no credit market. Then, the cost of capital is
determined by its opportunity cost, a constant interest rate of unity tied to a backyard technology, i.e., r =1 ,
and ﬁrms should self-ﬁnance and face the following borrowing constraint:
0 ≤ ki ≤ bi − xi. (4)
The higher is the initial wealth bi, the more likely it is that an agent will be an entrepreneur. A potentially
eﬃcient, low xi, agent may end up being a wageworker, constrained by low initial wealth bi.G i v e nw e a l t hbi
and market wage w,w ec a nd e ﬁne a marginal agent as one with setup cost xm(bi,w) who is indiﬀerent between
being a worker and being an entrepreneur, that is π(bi,x m,w)=w. If the setup cost is higher than xm,t h e
household will be a worker for sure. However, with the borrowing constraint in (4), the setup cost xi cannot
exceed his own wealth bi either. Therefore, given wage w and wealth bi, the critical setup cost for the marginal
agent is characterized:
z(bi,w)=m i n[ bi,x m(bi,w)]. (5)
With setup cost less than z(bi,w), the household chooses to be an entrepreneur, earning proﬁts higher than
wages. Proﬁts are thus the returns to heterogeneous talents. This selection feature yields non-zero proﬁts and
makes the typical constant-returns-to-scale (CRS) framework of growth accounting (i.e., zero proﬁts) break
down.








and proﬁt function becomes a second-degree polynomial in capital ki:
π(bi,x i,w)=C0(w)+C1(w)ki + C2k2

















Capital demand ki depends on wealth bi when the borrowing constraint binds, i.e., ki = bi − xi.F o r t h e
unconstrained entrepreneurs, the optimal capital demand k∗
1 is given by
k∗




which does not depend on wealth, and hence neither does the proﬁt.
The critical setup cost function z(b,w) can be characterized by the coeﬃcients of the proﬁt function:





2 − 4C2 (C0(w) − b − w)
2C2
,i fb b(w) ≤ b<b ∗(w)
= b, if b < b b(w),
where









The b∗(w) is the critical level of wealth above which the wealth constraint does not bind in occupation choice,
x∗(w) is the associated level of critical setup cost, and b b(w) is the wealth level below which the wealth constraint
binds exactly at the level of setup cost (xi = bi) and hence the capital demand ki hits the lower bound zero.
Now suppose that there is a second sector with a credit market for borrowing and saving. Then, the
borrowing constraint (4) drops, and the cost of capital is an equilibrium interest rate r ≥ 1t h a te q u a t e st h e
supply and the demand for capital in the credit market. The capital demand k∗
2 of the second sector is given by
k∗
2 =m a x {
ρ(α − r)+σ(ξ − w)
ρβ − σ2 ,0},











7Occupation choice in the credit sector is entirely determined by talent and not by individual wealth, where the
critical setup cost x∗






2 − w. (15)
An entrepreneur, whose setup cost xi is less than x∗






2(w,r) − xi. (16)
Note that, unlike the ﬁrst non-intermediated sector, the ﬁrm size in the intermediated sector is constant,
measured by either capital or labor, across ﬁrms, and the diﬀerential proﬁt comes only through diﬀerences in
individual talents, i.e., the setup cost xi. Also the Envelope theorem suggests that the proﬁt in the credit sector
should decrease when the factor prices of wage and interest rates increase.
We combine the two sectors in one model with an exogenously expanding intermediated sector mimicking
the Thai SES data.7 In this model, there are two extensive margins, diﬀerent occupations and diﬀerent access
to credit, which create the productivity diﬀerential. The same one unit of time endowment can be devoted
to diﬀerent types of income-generating activities depending on occupation choice. This creates heterogeneous
returns to the same time endowment as long as there exist occupational income gaps. Thus, occupational shift
from the traditional subsisters and laborers to the entrepreneurs enhances the productivity of the economy. In
the credit sector, this occupational shift is easier than in the non-credit sector, because the access to credit
relaxes the borrowing constraint in occupational choice. Thus, ﬁnancial deepening indirectly contributes to
productivity growth through this channel, extending the extensive margin. Access to credit helps to improve
the productivity via another route. In the credit sector, capital is used more eﬃciently on the intensive margin
among entrepreneurs yielding more proﬁt than in the non-credit sector. This gap in proﬁtability between the
two sectors creates a source of productivity growth from ﬁnancial deepening.
In sum, households of varying talent face an imperfect credit market in ﬁnancing the establishment of
business and in expanding the scale of enterprise. Thus, households are constrained by limited wealth on an
extensive margin of occupation choice and an intensive margin of capital utilized, though both constraints
can be alleviated over time as wealth accumulates. The pure occupational shift with given level of ﬁnancial
deepening can be another source of productivity growth. Financial deepening relaxes borrowing constraints
both on the extensive and intensive margins and enhances the productivity of the economy. Thus, as the
distribution of wealth evolves and ﬁnancial sector deepens, so does the occupational composition of population
and the allocation eﬃciency, generating the dynamics of aggregate output and productivity growth.
7Financial deepening may well be endogenous as in Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990). Here, we just impose the participation
decision in the ﬁnancial sector as in the data, hoping that we take a fair footing with the typical TFP literature, where the main
engine of growth, i.e., technical changes, is assumed to be exogenous. Jeong and Townsend (2003) indeed evaluate the Greenwood
and Jovanovic (1990) model, discussing the pros and cons of endogenizing the participation decision in the ﬁnancial sector, in
comparison with our current model of endogenous occupation choice with exogenous ﬁnancial deepening.
83 Method of Growth Accounting
3.1 Aggregation of Two-Sector Economy
We develop a method of growth accounting that is adapted to the above two-sector three-occupation model.
There are two sectors, one without access to credit (sector 1) and the other with access to credit (sector 2). The
three occupations are self-employed subsisters using traditional technology, wageworkers, and entrepreneurs
using modern technology. The labor market is integrated and wage rate w is common between two sectors.
However, the capital market is exogenously segmented, where the opportunity cost of capital diﬀers between
two sectors: it is unity, tied to the backyard technology, in sector 1, but it is the equilibrium interest rate r of
the credit market in sector 2. Owing to the exogenously embedded segmentation, we can derive the aggregate
relationships within each sector separately and then add them up to get economy-wide aggregate relationship.
3.1.1 Aggregation Within Sectors
Given equilibrium wage rate w,t h ep r o ﬁt πi1 of an agent i with setup cost xi and wealth bi who chooses to be
an entrepreneur (or a modern ﬁrm) in sector 1 is given by:
πi1 = π1(bi,x i,w)
= f(li1,k i1) − wli1 − ki1 − xi, (17)
where li1 and ki1 denote optimal demands for labor and capital, respectively:
li1 = l1(bi,x i,w),
ki1 = k1(bi,x i,w).
Thus, the output ym
i1 of the modern ﬁrm i in sector 1 by simply rearranging (17) can be expressed:
ym
i1 = f(li1,k i1)
= π1(bi,x i,w)+wl1(bi,x i,w)+k1(bi,x i,w)+xi,
and the total output Y m
1 of all modern ﬁr m si ns e c t o r1i sg i v e nb y :
Y m
1 = Π1 + wLm
1 + Km


























where z(b,w) is given in (11), Ψ1 denotes cumulative distribution functi o no fw e a l t hi ns e c t o r1( w h i c he n d o g e -
nously evolves over time), and H the time-invariant distribution function of setup cost. Equation (18) indicates
that the output produced in sector 1 is decomposed into proﬁts Π1, wage payment wLm
1 , contribution of working
capital Km
1 , and the contribution of setup-cost capital X1. Note that depreciation of capital is not incorporated
here, as in the model. Also note the explicit inclusion of setup cost, which is not typical in standard income
accounting.










1 for wage laborers,
Φs
1 =1 − Φe
1 − Φw
1 for traditional subsisters.




Let K1 denote the total wealth in sector 1. Wealth that is not used for modern production, K1 − Km
1 − X1 is
invested in the backyard storage technology and produces output Y b
1 w i t ht h er a t eo fr e t u r no fu n i t y :
Y b
1 = K1 − Km
1 − X1. (20)
Combining these three sources of output production in (18), (19), and (20), we get the total output in
sector 1, Y1:
Y1 = Y m
1 + Y s
1 + Y b
1
= Π1 + wLm
1 + Km
1 + X1 + Φs
1γ + K1 − Km
1 − X1
= Π1 + wΦw
1 + Φs
1γ + K1.
When both traditional and modern technologies coexist, the wage is set to reservation wage at w = γ, and hence
wΦw
1 +Φs
1γ = wL1,w h e r eL1 ≡ 1−Φe
1.N o t et h a tL1 indicates the population proportion of non-entrepreneurs
10in sector 1. When the surplus labor exhausted and wage endogenously starts to grow exceeding γ, Φs
1 =0 ,a n d
again wΦw
1 + Φs
1γ = wL1. Therefore, total output in sector 1 can be written as
Y1 = Π1 + wL1 + K1. (21)
Note that here the size of population in sector 1 is normalized to one. Equation (21) states simply that output
p e rc a p i t ai ns e c t o r1i st h es um of factor payments (proﬁt, wage income, and rental income) with the rental
rate of capital being set to unity.
In sector 2, where the credit market is open, the proﬁt πi2 of an agent i with setup cost xi and wealth bi
who chooses to be a modern ﬁrm in sector 2 is given by:
πi2 = π2(xi,w,r)
= f(li2,k i2) − wli2 − rki2 − xi,




Note that entrepreneurial talent, i.e., the setup cost, inﬂuences only on the extensive margin of occupation
choice, not the intensive margin of factor demands. This again implies that the size of modern ﬁrms are the
same in the intermediated credit sector, although they may earn diﬀerent levels of proﬁt, depending on innate
entrepreneurial talent.
Total output from modern ﬁrm Y m
2 in sector 2 can be similarly derived:
Y m
2 = Π2 + wLm
2 + rKm

























2(w,r) is given in (15).






2 for wage laborers,
Φs
2 =1 − Φe
2 − Φw
2 for traditional subsisters.




Let K2 denote the total wealth in sector 2. The wealth that is not used for modern production, K2 −Km
2 −X2,
is invested now in bank with rate of return r, producing income
Y b
2 = r(K2 − Km
2 − X2). (24)
Combining all these three sources of output in (22), (23), and (24), we get total output in sector 2, Y2:
Y2 = Y m
2 + Y s
2 + Y b
2
= Π2 + wLm
2 + rKm
2 + X2 + Φs
2γ + r(K2 − Km
2 − X2)
= Π2 + wΦw
2 + Φs
2γ + rK2 − (r − 1)X2.
Again using the relationship between wage and subsistence income, Y2 can be re-written as
Y2 = Π2 + wL2 + rK2 − (r − 1)X2, (25)
where L2 =1 −Φe
2, which is the population share of non-entrepreneurs in sector 2. Note that here the population
size in sector 2 is also normalized to one. Equation (25) states that output per capita in sector 2 is again the
sum of factor payments (proﬁt, wage income, and rental income) but subtracting the net rental income loss
from capital of setup cost, as the opportunity cost of investing in setup capital is unity rather than the interest
rate r.
3.1.2 Aggregation Between Sectors
Let p be the fraction of the intermediated sector in the entire economy. Then, economy-wide per capita output
Y is a weighted sum of sectoral outputs Y1 and Y2:
Y =( 1 − p)Y1 + pY2 (26)
= wL+ rK + Π − (r − 1)U (27)
12where
L =( 1 − p)L1 + pL2, (28)
K =( 1 − p)K1 + pK2, (29)
Π =( 1 − p)Π1 + pΠ2, (30)
U =( 1 − p)K1 + pX2. (31)
The equation (27) is an accounting identity for national income per capita. It looks similar to standard income
accounting identity except for two things. First, proﬁti n c o m eΠ is explicitly included. If the underlying
technology were subject to constant returns to scale and the aggregate capital K captured all relevant capital
factors, Π would be zero. Second, there is an adjustment term −(r − 1)U,w h e r eU is a weighted sum of total
capital in no-credit sector, K1, and the capital used for setup cost in credit sector, X2.T h e s e t w o k i n d s o f
capital do not earn positive net returns. In the income accounting equation (27), the aggregate capital of the
whole economy K is priced by the gross interest rate r. The adjustment term corrects this mismeasurement of
capital income, ﬁrst due to the limited access to credit market, and second due to the existence of the presumed
setup cost.
By diﬀerentiating both sides of (27) with respect to time and then dividing them by total output in base
year, we get a growth accounting identity:















and gV denotes the growth rate of variable V .8
In “standard” growth accounting in per capita terms, the Solow residual, SR,i sm e a s u r e db yt h ed i ﬀerence
between the output growth and the capital growth weighted by capital share such that:
SR ≡ gY − sKgK. (34)
8The growth accounting formula in (32) is written as a growth rate of Divisia index in continuous time. In practice, with
























where the upper bar denotes the average between periods s and t. Note that this formula is similar to the Tornqvist approximation
(that uses average of factor shares between dates) to the Divisia index, but our formula for discrete data is an exact decomposition
rather than an approximation. Hereafter, we apply this decomposition formula to all the following growth accounting.
13When the input factors of capital and labor are homogeneous within each category, the standard Solow residual
measures true TFP growth by deﬁnition. Surely the adjustment of quality variation is required for both capital
and labor. This adjustment is for measuring the eﬀective units of inputs. However, when there are diﬀerent
kinds of capital and labor in their nature, we need further adjustment for the composition of those kinds.
For example, the same labor endowment is used for diﬀerent kinds of activities across diﬀerent occupations,
which generates a heterogeneity for labor. The same wealth can be used between intermediated sector and
non-intermediated sector and also between working capital for production and ﬁxed setup cost, which generates
another heterogeneity for capital. Thus, by accounting for these kinds of heterogeneity, the true TFP growth,
TFPG,c a nb ed e ﬁned:
TFPG ≡ gY − (sKgK − sUgU) − sLgL (35)
= SR− sLgL + sUgU. (36)
Note that the standard Solow residual diverges from the true TFP growth by two sources, −sLgL and
sUgU. Laborers and traditional subsisters earn less income than entrepreneurs doing diﬀerent kinds of income-
generation activities. Thus, aggregate productivity is enhanced as the population share of laborers and tradi-
tional subsisters, L, decreases. The term −sLgL captures this eﬀect of occupational shift on the TFP growth.
The existence of the setup cost and limited access to credit market generate the heterogeneity in capital via
diﬀerential opportunity costs between the working capital and the capital for ﬁxed setup cost, and also between
the intermediated and non-intermediated sectors. The variable U measures the weighted sum of capital used for
setup cost in the intermediated sector and the total capital used in the non-intermediated sector, the net returns
of which are zero. The aggregate capital K includes two types of capital with diﬀerent opportunity costs of
saving (intermediated working capital versus non-intermediated and setup-cost capital) and the common rental
rate r is used in calculating the capital share in standard growth accounting. Thus, the term sUgU needs to
be subtracted (recall sU =
(r−1)U
Y ) from the contribution of aggregate capital accumulation sKgK to output
growth, which captures the eﬀect of the compositional change in heterogenous types of capital on the TFP
growth.
3.2 Decomposition of TFP Growth
In distinction from the standard TFP analysis, aggregate TFP growth does not remain as a residual but can be
further decomposed into its underlying sources. The main idea is that growth accounting by factor and growth
accounting by sector should each yield the same output growth. This will identify the sources of aggregate TFP
growth in terms of the sectoral TFP growth and the various compositional changes on their extensive margins.
Using the sectoral decomposition of aggregate output in (26), we can get another version of growth ac-
14counting identity as follows:









The growth rate of aggregate output is equal to the weighted sum of growth rates of sectoral outputs, i.e.,
(1−p)sY1gY1 +psY2gY2 plus growth due to compositional change between sectors, i.e., (sY2 −sY1)pgp.N o t et h a t
the sectoral compositional change here corresponds to the change in the extent of intermediation, i.e., ﬁnancial
deepening,a n dt h et e r m( sY2 − sY1)pgp captures the direct eﬀect of ﬁnancial deepening on output growth.
Applying the growth accounting by factor to each sector, we have:
gY1 = TFPG 1 +( sL1gL1 + sK1gK1 − sU1gK1), (38)
gY2 = TFPG 2 +( sL2gL2 + sK2gK2 − sU2gX2), (39)
where
TFPG1 ≡ SR1 − sL1gL1 + sU1gK1, (40)
TFPG2 ≡ SR2 − sL2gL2 + sU2gX2, (41)
SR1 ≡ gY1 − sK1gK1, (42)




















Note that each sectoral Solow residual SRj is not automatically zero although there is no within-sector technical
change because we do not impose CRS on production technology. Other sources of the sectoral TFP growth,
TFPG 1 and TFPG 2, include the within-sector compositional changes in heterogeneous labor (−sL1gL1 and
−sL2gL2) and capital (sU1gK1 and sU2gX2).
Substituting equations (38) to (39) into (37), we get
gY =( sY2 − sY1)pgp +( 1− p)sY1TFPG1 + psY2TFPG2 (44)
(1 − p)sY1(sL1gL1 + sK1gK1 − sU1gK1)+psY2(sL2gL2 + sK2gK2 − sU2gX2).
Recalling the formula for the aggregate TFP growth in (35), we have
gY = TFPG+ sLgL + sKgK − sUgU. (45)
15The aggregate factor growth in (45) can be decomposed into sectoral factor growth:
gL = g sL1(1 − p)gL1 + g sL2pgL2 +( g sL2 − g sL1)pgp, (46)
gK = g sK1(1 − p)gK1 + g sK2pgK2 +(g sK2 − g sK1)pgp, (47)





, g sL2 =
L2
L
, g sK1 =
K1
K
, g sK2 =
K2
K
, g sU1 =
K1
U




Substituting the equations (46) to (48) into the aggregate factor growth in (45), we get
gY = TFPG+[ sY2(sL2 + sK2 − sU2) − sY1(sL1 + sK1 − sU1)]pgp + (49)
(1 − p)sY1(sL1gL1 + sK1gK1 − sU1gK1)+psY2(sL2gL2 + sK2gK2 − sU2gX2).
Equating the two versions of growth accounting identity (44) and (49), we get the following decomposition
formula for TFP growth:
TFPG =( 1 − p)sY1TFPG 1 + psY2TFPG 2 (50)
+(sY2 − sY1)pgp − [sY2(sL2 + sK2 − sX2) − sY1(sL1 + sK1)]pgp.
This suggests that aggregate TFP growth does not necessarily coincide with the weighted sum of sectoral TFP
growth: the diﬀerence between them represents the eﬀect of ﬁnancial deepening.
Substituting (40) and (41) into (50), we can re-arrange the above decomposition formula as follows:
TFPG= TFPG SSR+ TFPG OCC + TFPG ACH + TFPG FIN (51)
where
TFPG SSR ≡ (1 − p)sY1SR1 + psY2SR2, (52)
TFPG OCC ≡− (1 − p)sY1sL1gL1 − psY2sL2gL2, (53)
TFPG ACH ≡ (1 − p)sY1sU1gK1 + psY2sU2gX2, (54)
TFPG FIN ≡ (sY2 − sY1)pgp − [sY2(sL2 + sK2 − sU2) − sY1(sL1 + sK1 − sU1)]pgp. (55)
This shows that the aggregate TFP growth is decomposed into four underlying sources: (i) the weighted sum
of sectoral Solow residuals (TFPG SSR), (ii) the eﬀect of compositional change in occupation (TFPG OCC),
16(iii) the eﬀect of adjusting capital heterogeneity (TFPG ACH), and (iv) the eﬀect of ﬁnancial deepening
(TFPG FIN).
The eﬀect of ﬁnancial deepening can be further decomposed into two components in (55): the eﬀect due
to the output gap between sectors, measured by (sY2 − sY1)pgp ,a n dt h ee ﬀect due to the diﬀerence in factor
shares between sectors, measured by −[sY2(sL2 +sK2 −sU2) −sY1(sL1 +sK1 −sU1)]pgp. Combining these two,
the eﬀect of ﬁnancial deepening on the TFP growth can be re-written:











showing that the ﬁnancial deepening can contributes to the TFP growth if and only if the intermediated sector
is more proﬁtable than the non-intermediated sector. As long as there exists an output gap between two sectors
such that Y2 >Y 1, ﬁnancial deepening contributes to aggregate output growth. However, the eﬀect of ﬁnancial
deepening on productivity growth comes through the proﬁtability gap between sectors, not the output gap. A
priori assumption of CRS leads to identical proﬁts of all entrepreneurs at zero in both sectors and precludes
this source of productivity growth from ﬁnancial deepening.
4D a t a
4.1 Data Sources
Thailand experienced fast economic growth as well as enormous structural changes for the two decades between
1976 and 1996. Our growth accounting method requires a use of both macro and micro data. Macro data are
obtained from various sources from the Thai government institutions. The series for Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) and capital stock are obtained from National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), both
denominated in 1988 Thai baht. The labor employment series are from Labor Force Survey (LFS) collected by
National Statistical Oﬃce (NSO). Due to the large share of agricultural sector in Thailand, the contribution
of land expansion may not be negligible. Thus, we measure the land size by the total area of cultivated land,
obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC). The factor share data are obtained from
the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI), documented by Tinakorn and Sussangkarn (1994, 1998).
We use the labor share data in Tinakorn and Sussangkarn (1998), who use the imputed wage from Social
Accounting Matrix (SAM) with base year 1995, rather than the wage from the national income accounts.9
The quality of labor is adjusted by taking wage diﬀerentials across diﬀerent population groups into account
(by age, gender, and education), again following Tinakorn and Sussangkarn (1998). These data are needed in
9See the discussion of Tinakorn and Sussangkarn (1994, 1998) on the problem of using wage income from national income
accounts in Thailand.
17calculating the annual series of the Thai TFP growth for the two decades according to the standard macro
growth accounting method.
The micro data on the wealth distribution, occupation choices, and ﬁnancial deepening are taken from
Jeong (2000), using the nationally representative household surveys, the Thai Socio-Economic Survey (SES),
collected by NSO. In particular, to simulate the model economy, we need the initial wealth distribution and
the path of ﬁnancial deepening that is to be exogenously embedded into the model. The initial wealth distri-
bution is estimated from the 1976 SES household assets data using the principal-component analysis.10 We
use the dichotomous occupation categories as the theory suggests. The self-employed and employers in the
non-agricultural sectors are categorized as entrepreneurs. Wageworkers and farmers are categorized into wage
laborers and traditional subsisters, respectively. The extent of ﬁnancial deepening is measured by the rate of
participation in formal ﬁnancial institutions in the Thai population. Using the SES data, we count the num-
ber of households who actually use in the previous month any of the ﬁnancial institutions: commercial banks,
savings banks, Bank for Agriculture & Agricultural Cooperative (BAAC), government housing banks, ﬁnancial
companies, and credit ﬁnanciers, and consider them as participants in the intermediated sector. The rest are
non-participants.
4.2 Standard Growth Accounting in Thailand
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 display the growth rates and payment shares of the three factors, respectively. The growth
rate of capital is more or less steady (at 7.8 percent on average), with a sudden acceleration between 1986 and
1990. The growth rate of labor is smaller (at 2.2 percent on average) but ﬂuctuates more than capital. The
growth rate of land is even smaller (at 0.8 percent on average) but moves most widely. However, land share
is small (5 percent on average) and is steadily declining to 2.8 percent by 1996. Labor and capital shares are
fairly stable until 1990, but the labor share shows an increasing trend while the capital share shows a decreasing
trend after 1990. The average factor shares are 40 percent for labor and 55 percent for capital.
Figure 1.3 decomposes the total input growth into the growth rates of three factors, each being weighted by
its own factor share, using the Divisia index method. The contribution of land expansion is virtually negligible.
Both the growth pattern and the magnitude of input growth are mainly determined by capital accumulation.
Though not negligible, the labor growth adds a small contribution.
Thai output, measured by real GDP in 1988 baht value, grows at 7.5 percent on average each year with
a clear acceleration in 1986, peaking in 1988, and then a gradual decline until 1996. The standard growth
accounting, using only these macro data, calculates the TFP growth as the diﬀerence between output growth
and input growth, where the input growth is measured from the sum of growth rates of factors (capital, labor,
10See Jeong (2000) and Jeong and Townsend (2003) for the details of the estimation procedure.
18and land) weighted by their factor shares. Equation (35) provides a formula for this in per capita terms. Figure
1.4 decomposes the Thai output growth into the input growth and the TFP growth according to the standard
growth accounting. The input growth contributes to 5.3 percent out of the total 7.5 percent of output growth.
Its contribution steadily increases until 1991 but begins to decline thereafter. The TFP grows at 2.2 percent
on average but is subject to substantial ﬂuctuations, closely tracking the ﬂuctuation of output growth. In
particular, the TFP growth surges in 1986, peaks in 1988 like the output growth, and then declines to near zero
after 1991.
5 Simulation
We now bring both the macro and micro data to the model to select model’s parameters and initial wealth
distribution (the fundamental inputs of the model). The parameters are chosen to ﬁt the aggregate Thai output
growth rate and factor shares from the macro data and the initial wealth distribution is estimated from the micro
data, the Thai SES. We then simulate the model. The simulation will help us to understand the underlying
mechanisms and sources of the TFP growth. Finally, we bring the model back to the data to further decompose
the aggregate TFP growth.
5.1 Calibration
We calibrate the parameters of the model. The preference parameter $, propensity to save, is calibrated at
0.3t om a t c ht h eaverage savings rate in the national income accounts of Thailand during the two decades
between 1976 and 1996. The subsistence return parameter γ is calibrated at 0.019 to match the 1976 annual
wage payment at a scale of 10−7 that converts Thai baht unit into the model income unit. Here, we suppose
the 1976 Thai wage to be close to the reservation wage, w = γ in the model. In fact, the occupational shift
from farmers to wage earners was quite fast in the Thai economy during the ﬁrst decade of 1976-1986, but the
Thai wage grew only slowly for the period, relative to the second decade of 1986-1996. Thus the approximation
of γ by the 1976 wage seems reasonable.
To be consistent, the initial wealth distribution in the Thai data is put into the model using the same
scale that converts Thai baht unit to the model income unit. Thus, given the bounded support and additive
nature of the setup cost x and the borrowing constraint in (4), the choice of scale is important for the growth
dynamics of the model, not only through the value of γ but also through the scale of initial wealth distribution.
For instance, the higher the scale is, i.e., the wealthier the model economy becomes, the higher is the fraction
of entrepreneurs, but too much wealth may induce the agents consume their wealth rather than save it and
the economy suﬀers from negative growth initially. The higher is the scale, the greater is this initial negative
growth, although this relationship is not monotone. Eventually the economy starts to grow, but overall growth
19for the entire sampling period can be negative when the initial negative growth is too large. So we restrict the
range of scale parameter and select a scale parameter that generates the patterns of the observed aggregate
growth in Thailand.11
Conditional on $, γ, and scale parameter, the technology parameters α, β, ξ, ρ, and σ are calibrated to
match the key aggregate objects in growth accounting exercise, i.e., the paths of GDP growth rate and labor
share in Thailand for the period of 1976-1996, using an explicit root-mean-squared-error criterion (the two paths
being equally weighted). Thus the model economy is aligned to mimic the patterns of aggregate growth of the
actual Thai economy. (Note again that this calibration of technology parameters is done along with the search
of the scale parameter.) Table 1 summarizes the selected parameters.
Table 1. Model Parameters
$ γαβξ ρ σ
0.30 0.019 1.111 0.001 0.100 0.0063 0.000
5.2 Aggregate Dynamics
The simulated economy tracks output growth and the labor share of Thailand well, as is shown in Figures 2.1
and 2.2. The simulated annual growth rate is a little lower than the actual Thai data (varying from 4 to 14
percent), which may indicate that the model misses some of the engines of growth in Thailand. However, the
dynamic patterns of the Thai growth, the slow-down in early 1980’s, the surge after 1986, and the continual
decline thereafter, are very well captured by the model economy. The simulated labor share is a little lower
than the Thai data (varying from 35 to 45 percent), but again the model captures the dynamic patterns like
the upturn of the labor share after 1990 in the data. This is mainly due to the wage growth rather than the
change in employment, both in the model and the data.
The population fraction of the credit sector, which is estimated from the SES data, represents the level
of ﬁnancial deepening. This is displayed in Figure 2.3, showing a non-linear expansion of the ﬁnancial sector,
and exogenously embedded into the model. The participation rate in the ﬁnancial sector increases gradually
f r o m6t o1 0p e r c e n tf o rt h eﬁrst decade, and then accelerates after 1986 from 10 to 27 percent. The fraction
of entrepreneurs in the model is lower than the data and the gap is large, as shown in ﬁgure 2.4.12 The Thai
population fraction of entrepreneurs stays constant around 15 percent, and only after 1990, does it begin to
11In Jeong and Townsend (2003), the scale parameter of the same model was chosen under the same kind of restriction of excluding
overall negative growth, but to maximize the likelihood of the occupation choice in the micro data, i.e., the SES. The chosen scale
there was 0.6 ∗ 10−7. We do perform a sensitivity analysis at this scale in the following subsection.
12Here, the category of entrepreneurs in the data is a bit broad, including both employer and self-employed in non-agriculture.
When we include employers only, the gap in the fraction of entrepreneurs between the model and the data becomes quite small.
However, with a view to identifying the occupation of entrepreneurs by their activity of generating proﬁts, broad category of
entrepreneurs seems more appropriate. Fortunately, the dynamic pattern, the gradual increase in the fraction, is invariant to both
broad and narrow categorization of entrepreneurs.
20rise, reaching 19 percent by 1996. The simulated fraction of entrepreneurs also gradually increases from 1.5 to
8.4 percent, with acceleration in 1986 when the rate of ﬁnancial deepening accelerates.
The most remarkable performance of the model is its prediction for TFP growth. The Thai TFP growth
series are calculated following the standard growth accounting practices, using the aforementioned various
sources of data, as the diﬀerence between the growth rate of real GDP and the sum of growth rates of three
factors (capital, land, and quality-adjusted labor) weighted by the output shares of the factors. The average
Thai TFP growth rate for the two decades 1976-1996 is 2.4 percent, ﬂuctuating from -1.6 percent in 1980 to 7.8
percent in 1988. The Thai TFP growth is compared with the simulated TFP growth, calculated from (35), in
Figure 2.5, showing that the simulated TFP growth tracks the actual Thai TFP growth remarkably well, both
in terms of the co-movement and the orders of magnitude.
Figures 3.1 shows that the interest rate starts at very high level and continuously declines (with the
exception in 1986 when the ﬁnancial expansion starts to accelerate). This is a typical feature of diminishing
returns to capital accumulation. Figure 3.2 shows that wage stays constant at the reservation level of γ until
1990 and then continuously grows. The movements of proﬁtd i ﬀer between the two sectors as Figure 3.3 shows.
In the non-intermediated sector, proﬁt is more or less constant over time even when the wage grows. In the
credit sector, however, proﬁt sharply increases during the ﬁrst three periods, becomes stable, and then declines
when the wage grows. Overall, average proﬁt gradually increases until 1990 and then becomes constant. The








as in (57), determines the size of the eﬀect of ﬁnancial deepening
on the aggregate TFP growth. Figure 3.4 shows that it ﬁrst increases sharply for the initial three periods, stays
constant until 1986, and then continuously declines after the non-linear ﬁnancial sector expansion.
5.3 Decomposition of TFP Growth
The period of upturn of output growth rate coincides with the accelerated expansion of participation in the
ﬁnancial sector in Thailand. Thus, the output growth in Thailand seems to be related to that ﬁnancial expansion.
In an accounting sense, when the credit sector produces more output, i.e., the agents in the credit sector earns
more income than the non-credit sector, the expansion of the credit sector contributes to growth in aggregate
output. The decomposition analysis for the SES in Jeong (2000) suggests that, combined with changes in
occupational composition, ﬁnancial expansion accounts for 36% of the Thai income growth for the two decades
1976-1996. Financial expansion alone accounts 20% of the overall growth. Furthermore, for the acceleration
period of the expansion of ﬁnancial sector, i.e., 1986-1992, the ﬁnancial expansion contributes to income growth
at 27%. That is, the upturn of the output growth is apparently quite related to the accelerated ﬁnancial
expansion. The patterns of the TFP growth, the decline in early 1980’s and then the surge when the expansion of
ﬁnancial sector accelerates, resembles those of output growth in both the model and the data. These observations
21give us the clue: the eﬀects of ﬁnancial expansion on output growth are through TFP growth. Moreover, we
now identify the sources of the simulated TFP growth using the decomposition formula (51) and explicitly check
if this is indeed so.
Figure 4.1 displays from the model the four components of the aggregate TFP growth, TFPG SSR,
TFPG OCC, TFPG ACH,a n dTFPG FIN, calculated from the equations (52) to (55), respectively. The
sum of the sectoral Solow residuals, TFPG SSR, turns out to be negligible. So are the occupational shift eﬀects,
TFPG OCC. This negligible size of TFPG OCC may look puzzling, recalling the gradual but signiﬁcant
occupational shift from laborers and traditional subsisters to entrepreneurs in the model, as shown in Figure
2.4. Using the equation (46), the total eﬀect of occupational shift, −sLgL,i sg i v e nb y :
−sLgL = −sL{g sL1(1 − p)gL1 + g sL2pgL2 +( g sL2 − g sL1)pgp}
= −(1 − p)sY1sL1gL1 − psY2sL2gL2 − (sY2sL2 − sY1sL1)pgp
= TFPG OCC − (sY2sL2 − sY1sL1)pgp.
Here, the total eﬀect of occupational shift includes TFPG OCC,t h ew e i g h t e ds u mo fe ﬀects from within-
sector occupational shifts, and the eﬀect of occupational shift due to the expansion of the credit sector, i.e.,
−(sY2sL2 − sY1sL1)pgp. The average fraction of entrepreneurs in the credit sector in the model is 30 percent
while it is only 1 percent in the non-credit sector. Due to this gap, simply expanding the credit sector can
increase the aggregate fraction of entrepreneurs without changing TFPG OCC when there are no within-sector
occupational shifts. The direct source of the latter eﬀe c ti si nf a c tt h eﬁnancial expansion, and we attribute this
eﬀect to TFPG FIN.
The interest rate determines the diﬀerential rates of returns between heterogeneous types of capital and
t h es i z eo fTFPG ACH, i.e., the eﬀect of changes in the composition of heterogeneous types of capital depends
on the movement of market interest rate. This eﬀect turns out to be signiﬁcant only for the ﬁrst three periods
when the interest rate is very high and quickly declining. (See Figure 3.1.)
Except for those three periods, the eﬀect of ﬁnancial deepening, TFPG FIN, almost entirely explains the
simulated TFP growth. Figure 4.2 decomposes TFPG FIN into the output-gap eﬀect (sY2 − sY1)pgp and the
input-diﬀerential eﬀect −[sY2(sL2 +sK2 −sU2)−sY1(sL1 +sK1 −sU1)]pgp as in equation (55). This shows that
main reason ﬁnancial deepening contributes to the TFP growth is the output-gap rather than the diﬀerence in
factor shares between the intermediated sector and the non-intermediated sector.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 decompose the within-sector TFP growth in each sector, TFPG 1 and TFPG2,u s i n g
(40) and (41), respectively. They show ﬁrst that the within-sector occupational shift eﬀects (−sL1gL1 for non-
credit sector and −sL2gL2 for credit sector) are tiny if not zero in both sectors. The eﬀects of compositional
change in heterogeneous capital for the initial periods come mainly from the credit sector but are very small
22after the initial three periods. The non-credit-sector Solow residual SR1,d e ﬁned in (42), surges in 1990 precisely
when the wage starts to grow and this is the main determinant of the non-credit sector TFP growth TFPG 1,
as shown in Figure 4.3. In the credit sector, however, the Solow residual SR2,d e ﬁned in (43), together with
the TFPG 2 turn negative and counter-move with SR1 and TFPG 1 after the wage starts to grow.
The asymmetric eﬀects of wage growth on the sectoral Solow residuals can be better understood from the
dual expression of the sectoral Solow residual, SRd
j, which is a weighted sum of growth in factor prices including
proﬁt:
SRd
j = sLjgw + sKjgr + sΠjgΠj, (58)
for each sector j =1 , and 2. Hsieh (2002) provides a clear discussion on how to use the factor price data in
accounting for the East Asian economic growth in this dual framework, but he ignores proﬁts component in
his application. Obviously, wage growth has a direct and positive contribution to the Solow residual, but it
may decrease proﬁt and reduce the Solow residual. In particular, wage growth decreases proﬁt in the credit
sector for sure because all entrepreneurs earn optimal proﬁt, which is a decreasing function of wage as in (5.3).
Thus, the overall eﬀect of wage growth on Solow residual depends on the relative share of wage income to proﬁt
income, which is much larger in the non-credit sector than the credit sector. The rental shares are about the
same between the two sectors, 0.29 in the non-intermediated sector, and 0.24 in the intermediated sector, and
the eﬀects of change in interest rate on the sectoral TFP growth are similar between the two sectors. Thus, the
asymmetric response of the sectoral TFP growth is related to wage growth, not to the change in interest rate.
On average, sL1 =0 .57 and sΠ1 =0 .14 in the non-credit sector while sL2 =0 .07 and sΠ2 =0 .69 in the credit
sector. Thus, the net contribution of wage growth on the Solow residual may well be larger in the non-credit
sector than in the credit sector. It is in fact even negative in the credit sector. It is interesting to notice the
possibility that the same wage growth boosts the TFP growth in one sector but hurts the other sector. In
the non-intermediated sector, where most people live on wage or traditional self-employed income, wage growth
plays a positive role in increasing the productivity growth. However, in the credit sector, where modern business
is active, the direct positive contribution of the wage growth may be more than oﬀset by the indirect negative
eﬀect on the TFP growth via proﬁtr e d u c t i o n .
Substituting the dual version of the sectoral Solow residuals SRd
j for j = 1 and 2 as in (58) into TFPG SSR
in (52), we get
TFPG SSR =( 1 − p)sY1(sL1gw + sK1gr + sΠ1gΠ1)+psY2(sL2gw + sK2gr + sΠ2gΠ2) (59)
= sLgw + sKgr +[ ( 1− p)sY1sΠ1gΠ1 + psY2sΠ2gΠ2],
which shows that the overall eﬀect depends on economy-wide eﬀects of growth in wage and rental rates and the
23diﬀerential proﬁt growth between the sectors. The overall eﬀect of TFPG SSR was already shown to be nil in
Figure 4.1 although again within-sector Solow residuals respond to wage growth substantially, as is evident in
Figures 4.3 and 4.4, after 1990.
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Here, we check the robustness of our simulation results, focusing on the output growth, TFP growth, and the
decomposition of TFP growth. We perturb the parameter values around those of the above benchmark. There
are restrictions on the parameter space implied by the structure of the model. They suggest possible ranges of
variation of parameters in this sensitivity analysis. The critical setup cost function z in (11) is an increasing
concave function in wealth, which implies an order among critical values that characterize this function:
0 ≤ b b(w) ≤ x∗(w) ≤ b∗(w),
which in turn implies that
C0(w) ≥ w, (60)
C1(w) ≥ 0, (61)
C2 ≤ 0. (62)
Then, combining equations (8) to (10) with these inequality constraints (60) to (62), the parameters should
satisfy that













for any positive wage w. This suggests that appropriate ranges of parameters are determined interdependently
among each other. We perform sensitivity analysis within this parameter space.
Given technology parameters α, β, ξ, ρ, and wage w, the legitimate range of σ i sb o u n d e db o t hf r o mb e l o w
and from above. Furthermore, excluding negative complementarity between labor and capital, the lower bound
of σ is zero. Thus, in the neighborhood of the calibrated parameters of the benchmark economy, the possible
range of σ is indeed tightly bounded by [0,0.0025]. Varying σ over this range makes for virtually no changes.
Figure A.1 shows the growth dynamics and the decomposition at the maximum σ =0 .0025.
With σ at zero, the non-constant coeﬃcients of the proﬁtf u n c t i o nC1 and C2 are eﬀectively determined
by α and β, i.e., C1 = α − 1, and C2 = − 2
β, independent from the wage. Thus changes in α and β may aﬀect
the shape of the proﬁt function, and subsequently the growth dynamics, but not in relation to the wage. With
σ at zero, changes in α and β may aﬀect x∗ and b∗, but again not in relation to the evolution of the wage, i.e.,
24these changes do not shift the occupation map over time.13 Note that the main driving force behind the growth
dynamics of the model is the interaction between occupation choice and capital accumulation. Therefore, the
growth dynamics remain robust to the perturbation of α and β.V a r y i n gα over [1,1.3] and β over [0.0001,0.1]
indeed makes for virtually no changes. Figure A.2 shows the case with α =1 .3.
In contrast, the other technology parameters ξ and ρ can directly aﬀect both growth dynamics and occu-
pation choice via C0(w) in relation to wage, although σ is near zero. An increase in ξ implies an increase in
the intercept term C0(w)o ft h ep r o ﬁt function. It also implies an increase in marginal productivity of labor
by constant term (MPL= ξ − ρl with σ at zero). This makes the modern business more proﬁtable and draws
more savings into the modern technology, which is more productive than the traditional one. Thus output and
productivity growth becomes faster. Figure A.3, increasing ξ by 10 percent to 0.11, conﬁrms this. Compar-
ing the decomposition results with those of the benchmark economy, we ﬁnd that the dynamic patterns of all
underlying sources of the TFP growth remain the same although the magnitude of ﬂuctuations is larger.
An increase in ρ plays a similar role to a decrease in ξ, i.e., decrease in proﬁtability of modern business.
Figure A.4 displays that increasing ρ from 0.0063 to 0.0080 reduces output growth as well as the TFP growth.
Here, again the dynamic patterns of the underlying sources of the TFP growth are the same as the benchmark
case but the magnitudes of ﬂuctuation become smaller.
The value of ω was calibrated at 0.30 to match the aggregate savings ratio. The Thai SES suggests a lower
estimate of average savings rate at 0.25 with standard deviation 0.02. A decrease in ω i n d u c e sl e s ss a v i n g ,w h i c h
makes capital accumulation slower and occupational transition of the constrained households more diﬃcult.
Figure A.5 shows that lowering ω to 0.25 reduces output growth and TFP growth but only slightly. The
decomposition results are again robust.
T h ec h o i c eo fγ aﬀects two things. First, it determines the relative productivity of the traditional technology
to the modern technology and hence the income gap across occupation groups, and second, the wealth scale of
the model economy. As γ decreases, the traditional technology becomes less productive and thus widens the
occupational income gap. This increases the incentives for the occupational shift into modern business, which
tends to promote growth. At the same time, a decrease in γ makes the economy poorer and increases the degree
of constraints for the occupational shift into modern business, which makes growth deteriorate. The overall
eﬀect cannot be determined ap r i o r i . However, the patterns of both growth dynamics and the decomposition
results remain robust to the perturbation of γ over [0.012,0.025] although magnitude of ﬂuctuations diﬀers.
Figure A.6 displays the case of reducing γ to 0.012. Both the output and the TFP growth are accentuated
during the period of acceleration of ﬁnancial expansion, but again the occupational shift eﬀects are virtually
13Varying σ away from zero, a change in α could aﬀect income and occupation choice in relation to wage via C1(w). However,
the range of σ [0,0.0025] turns out to be not wide enough to generate any signiﬁcant changes.
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In sum, the simulated dynamics of output and TFP growth and the sources of TFP growth turn out to
be robust to the perturbation of the model parameters. In particular, changes in α, β, and σ make virtually
no diﬀerence. The parameters ξ, ρ, ω,a n dγ seem more important in determining the dynamics of output and
T F Pg r o w t h .H o w e v e r ,t h eo r d e r so fm a g n i t u d eo fc h a n g ef r o mv a r y i n gt h e s ep a r a m e t e r si nt h en e i g h b o r h o o d
of the benchmark economy are small. In particular, the importance of ﬁnancial deepening on the TFP growth
is robust to every perturbation.
6 Sources of Actual Thai TFP Growth
6.1 Decomposition of Actual TFP Growth
Let’s bring the model back to the actual data. If we had all pieces of data in the decomposition formulae (51)
to (55), we might apply the same decomposition method to the actual Thai economy, precisely as we did to the
simulated Thai economy above. The fundamental diﬃculty is that the economy is partitioned via the access
to credit and it is impossible to diﬀerentiate key variables such as factor shares and capital use between credit
sector and non-credit sector from the macro data. Fortunately, the use of micro data allows us to go inside the
residual TFP growth.
We partition the households into two groups, non-participant group (sector 1) and participants group
(sector 2), from the ﬁnancial asset transaction records of the SES, as was explained in Section 4. Then, some
key pieces of data for the components of TFP growth in (52) to (55) can be obtained from the SES. The within-
sector occupational shift terms, gL1 and gL2 in (53), are measured by the growth rates of population shares
of entrepreneurs within each group, from the household characteristics data in the SES. The sector share data
(1−p)sY1sL1 and psY2sL2, i.e., the coeﬃcients of gL1 and gL2 in (53), are measured by the income shares of the
two groups, from the household income data in the SES. Thus, we compute the actual TFPG OCC in (53) for
Thailand.
Unfortunately, even partitioning the population by the access to credit, the data on capital stocks and
capital shares at sectoral level such as sK1, sU1, sK2, sU2, gK1, gK2,a n dgX2 are not available from the household
survey, and the components of TFPG SSR and TFPG ACH cannot be constructed separately. Neither is the
complete calculation of the TFPG FIN component possible due to the lack of information. However, we can
recover part of it. The level and change of participation rate, p and gp, are constructed from the population share
of the participants in the ﬁnancial sector. The coeﬃcient (sY2 − sY1)o npgp is measured by the gap in relative
income between two sectors, which is available again from the household income record in the SES. Thus, the
14The γ value at 0.012 is chosen in the previous study by Jeong and Townsend (2003), which maximizes the likelihood of
occupation choice of the Thai households from structural estimation.
26output gap eﬀect of TFPG FIN, which was the dominant component of TFPG FIN in the simulation, can
be calculated.
Approximating the TFPG FIN by (sY2 − sY1)pgp, and precisely computing the TFPG OCC from the
SES, Figure 5.1 decomposes the actual Thai TFP growth, obtained from the macro growth accounting in Section
4, into the underlying sources. Here, again, the occupational shift eﬀect TFPG OCC turns out to be negligible
and the ﬁnancial deepening contributes to the actual TFP growth as in the simulated TFP growth. The
“Remainder” in includes both TFPG SSR and TFPG ACH. This component of the TFP growth ﬂuctuates
the most widely tracing the total TFP growth.
T h es i z ea n dm o v e m e n to ft h et w oc o m p o n e n t so fTFPG OCC and TFPG FIN can be directly conﬁrmed
as above and also compared with the model simulation. Figure 5.2 compares the TFPG OCC components
between the model and the actual Thai data, showing that both are near zero within the range of -0.2 to 0.5
percent although increasing from zero to 0.5 percent after 1990 in the actual data. Figure 5.3 shows a remarkable
resemblance of the ﬁnancial deepening eﬀects TFPG FIN between the model and the data. The simulated
TFPG FIN is a bloated version of the actual one but the movements over time virtually coincide.
The “Remainder” components are compared between the model and the data in Figure 5.4, showing that
the simulated remainder term tracks the actual one quite closely until 1985 and then counter-moves until
1994. Given the data limitation, the actual remainder term cannot be further decomposed. However, the
decomposition of the simulated TFP growth helps us to infer the possible sources of this remainder term in the
data. Figure 4.1 suggests the initially high but declining TFP growth is possibly due to TFPG ACH,t h ee ﬀect
of compositional change in heterogeneous types of capital during the initial periods 1976-1980. Neither from
national income data nor from typical household surveys is direct conﬁrmation of this eﬀect possible, because of
the diﬃculty of observing diﬀerential rates of returns as well as the structure of capital between intermediated
and non-intermediated sectors. A synthesis between two types of micro data, i.e., ﬁrm surveys and household
surveys seems needed to conﬁrm this conjecture.
We learned from the simulation (Figures 4.3 and 4.4) that the sectoral Solow residual, TFPG SSR,m a y
respond to wage growth, particularly when the wage jumps up and that the overall eﬀect of wage growth on
the Solow residual, TFPG SSR, depends on the relative income shares among wage, rental, and proﬁt. In
particular, the response of proﬁt to wage growth may diﬀer across sectors, which may in turn generate an
asymmetric response of the Solow residuals across sectors. Figure 6 shows that the Thai wage started to grow in
1986, earlier than in the simulation. Thus, though not entirely, part of the remainder TFP growth in Thailand
for the second decade 1986-1996 is likely to be related to the wage movement in Thailand. The dual expression
of TFPG SSR in (59) suggests that there are no ap r i o r idirections of this eﬀect on the Solow residual because
there are no uniform responses of proﬁts between the non-intermediated and intermediated sectors and because
27relative factor income shares are varying over time. Thus, its eﬀect can be positive or negative. The model
suggests that wage growth can substantially reduce proﬁts particularly in the credit sector. This is because
every entrepreneur is unconstrained in hiring capital and labor, and obtains the optimal proﬁt function, which
is a decreasing function in wage. Therefore, the more the wage grows, the smaller the proﬁt in the credit sector
becomes, which makes the sectoral Solow residual more negative. This can explain why the remainder TFP
growth in Thailand turns from positive to negative during the second decade, as the wage growth continues.
However, regarding the surge of the remainder TFP growth during 1986-1988, the model is silent and this
remains a puzzle.
In sum, the above decomposition from a synthetic use of macro and micro data under the speciﬁcg r o w t h
model delivers several lessons. First, the ﬁnancial deepening substantially contributes to the actual Thai TFP
growth while the occupational shift from laborers and farmers to non-farm entrepreneurs does only slightly. By
ﬁltering out these compositional eﬀects from the standard TFP growth (2.2 percent on average), the remainder
TFP growth becomes 1 percent during the entire two-decade period 1976-1996 and 0.4 percent during the second
decade 1986-1996 on average. That is, “our measure of ignorance” is reduced to more than half by identifying
the two kinds of compositional eﬀects from the micro data. Second, the Solow residual, even after ﬁltering the
compositional eﬀects out, can be non-zero. The theory (without incorporating exogenous technical changes)
helps us to interpret, though not entirely, part of the remainder term of the Thai TFP growth. The initially
high but declining TFP growth during 1976-1980 may come from the compositional change in heterogeneous
types of capital. The turning of positive TFP growth to negative for 1988-1996 may come from the sectoral
Solow residual in relation to the wage growth started from 1986. However, the surge of the remainder TFP
growth during 1986-1988 remains a puzzle.
6.2 Factor Accumulation and TFP Growth
Combining the standard growth accounting results in Section 4.2 with the above TFP growth decomposition
results according to equations (51) to (52), we can identify the sources of the Thai growth and the patterns of
their movements. Figure 7 displays the four major sources of the Thai growth, capital accumulation, increase in
eﬀective labor, TFP growth from ﬁnancial deepening, and the remainder TFP growth, dropping the two minor
sources of growth, i.e., the land expansion and the occupational shift from laborers and farmers to non-farm
entrepreneurs.
We ﬁnd that, with a few exceptional periods, capital accumulation contributes the most to the Thai growth,
and it was quite stable during the ﬁrst decade. The contribution of labor growth ﬂuctuates more than that
of capital accumulation. During the second decade when the ﬁnancial sector expanded, all three components,
capital accumulation, the ﬁnancial-deepening TFP growth, and the remainder TFP growth surged, which “ex-
28plains” the growth-peak period of Thailand. The wage also started to grow with the ﬁnancial expansion. Thus,
the expansion of ﬁnancial sector not only directly increased the productivity of the Thai economy but also
seemed to foster the capital accumulation. The contributions of these three components declined with diﬀerent
peaks and speeds. The contributions of capital accumulation and the ﬁnancial-deepening TFP growth declined
gradually after 1991. The remainder TFP growth peaked earlier in 1988 and then quickly declined to negative.
Another interesting observation is that after 1991, all components except the remainder TFP growth declined
and the remainder TFP growth was negative, presaging perhaps the upcoming ﬁnancial crisis in 1997.
7C o n c l u s i o n
The existing literature of TFP usually measures the size of TFP but rarely identiﬁes its sources directly. The
sources of the TFP growth typically remain unknown inside the residual. We attempted to ﬁnd what is inside
of the residual by integrating the model with the data and by synthesizing the micro data with the macro
data. Specifying a growth model that articulates the micro underpinnings, we brought the actual macro data
to the model to choose the parameter values that best mimic the actual aggregate output growth patterns.
At those parameter values, initial wealth distribution and the participation rates in the ﬁnancial sector were
obtained from the micro data and were exogenously embedded into the model to simulate the economy. The
simulated TFP growth was decomposed into four components; occupational-shifts eﬀect, ﬁnancial-deepening
eﬀect, capital-heterogeneity eﬀect, and the sum of sectoral Solow residuals. Then, we brought the model back
to the data and showed how to decompose the TFP growth of the actual economy using the micro data.
The model in this paper emphasizes two important extensive margins that create the productivity diﬀer-
ential across sectors and activities in the economy. First, the rates of return to the same time endowment are
diﬀerent across occupations. Second, the rates of return to the capital and hence the proﬁtability of modern
ﬁrms also diﬀer between the credit sector and the non-credit sector. Expansion of the credit sector improves the
aggregate eﬃciency not only directly via the second type of proﬁtability margin but also indirectly via the ﬁrst
type of occupational margin. Thus, ﬁnancial deepening can be an important source of productivity growth. The
occupational shifts within each sector can also be a separate source of productivity growth. These sources of
productivity growth may well be particularly important for the economies in transition and they can be hidden
in the standard TFP growth measure.
This model brings another important issue of capital heterogeneity in growth accounting. First, when the
access to credit is limited only to a subset of the economy, the rates of return to the same capital can be diﬀerent
between the intermediated sector and non-intermediated sector. Second, even within each sector, existence of
ﬁxed setup cost generates another kind of capital heterogeneity because the setup cost capital is sunk without
29being paid any positive instant return. These kinds of capital heterogeneity give us other kinds of caution on
the use of aggregate production function and the standard growth accounting. The problem from the usual
capital homogeneity assumption in understanding the economic growth in transition was noticed early, which is
cogently stated by Schultz (1988) such that “the simplifying assumption that capital is homogeneous is a disaster
to capital theory (Hicks, 1965), and ... is subject to serious doubts. ··· The dynamics of economic growth is
aﬂoat on capital inequalities because of the diﬀerences in rates of returns when disequilibria prevail, ··· Thus,
one of the essential parts of economic growth is concealed by such aggregation.” Banerjee and Duﬂo (2004)
provide a review that cautions the use of aggregate production function for growth theory in various development
contexts, including credit constraints. In the standard growth accounting, this capital heterogeneity eﬀect can
be hidden in the TFP growth occurred when the composition of the heterogeneous types of capital changes.
The above methodology of identifying the sources of the TFP growth was applied to Thailand, where
enormous structural changes accompanied the rapid economic growth for the two decades 1976-1996. Standard
growth accounting from the macro data suggests that capital accumulation was the major source of the total
output growth, but at the same time the TFP growth was also the substantial source of growth in Thailand. We
found that ﬁnancial deepening, i.e., expansion of access to credit, played a key role in explaining the Thai TFP
growth from the decomposition of either the simulated economy or the actual economy. Furthermore, combining
the macro growth accounting results with the micro TFP growth decomposition results, we found that ﬁnancial
deepening and capital accumulation move together and explain both the growth-peak in the middle of 1980’s
and the gradual decline after 1991 of the Thai economy. The occupational shifts from traditional subsisters and
laborers into entrepreneurs explained minor part of the TFP growth because the occupational transition itself
was not substantial. In fact, this was also true in the actual data. The capital heterogeneity eﬀect on the TFP
growth were substantial only for the short initial periods in simulation. We also learned from simulation that the
sectoral Solow residuals become important in explaining the TFP growth when the wage endogenously grows
and also that its eﬀect depends on relative factor income shares and can diﬀer across sectors. In particular, the
wage growth can contribute to reduce the sectoral Solow residual within the credit sector through the proﬁt
reduction. In the actual data, we could not separate the capital heterogeneity eﬀect from the sectoral Solow
residual eﬀect because within-sector capital and setup cost data are not available. However, the remainder TFP
growth term including these two eﬀects indeed were substantial in the actual Thai data either only for the short
initial periods or only when the Thai wage started to grow. Thus, the remainder TFP growth in the actual
data shows exactly the same combined patterns of simulation.
For the rapidly growing economy with structural changes like Thailand, we could ﬁnd the TFP growth
in terms of ﬁnancial deepening without presuming exogenous technical progress, from synthesizing the micro
and macro data in the tight nexus between theory and data. Thus, the tendency of inferring the importance
30of technical change from the standard aggregate Solow residual seems indeed misleading. The industry-level
disaggregate TFP growth may provide more precise estimate of productivity growth. However, note that we
partitioned the economy by occupation and access to credit. All compositional eﬀects from occupational shifts,
ﬁnancial deepening, and capital heterogeneity can be still alive even within the industry-level TFP growth.
Thus, the same caution is still valid to the industry-level disaggregate TFP growth. Only by using the micro
data, ideally in combination of household and ﬁrm data, together with the macro data can this problem be
resolved. Explicit use of theory provides critical help for this.
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34A Appendix: Estimation of Missing Observations
The data for labor share for the years earlier than 1980 and for the ﬁnal year 1996 are not available. Thus, we
ﬁll the missing observations for labor share xt by estimating a AR(2) model:
xt = λ0 + λ1xt−1 + λ2xt−2 + εt, (65)
where the disturbance term εt is drawn from i.i.d. normal distribution N(0,σε). Using the time-series sample
between 1980 and 1995, the model is estimated and Table A.1 reports the estimates (with standard errors in
parentheses). All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant with p-values less than 0.001.
Table A.1. Estimated Parameters for AR(2) Model of Labor Share
λ0 λ1 λ2 σε
0.0773 1.5431 -0.7385 0.0093
(0.0035) (0.1824) (0.2257) (0.0023)
The missing value for 1996 is predicted from 1995 and 1994 labor shares using the equation (65) at the
above estimates. To get the missing labor shares before 1980, we need to re-formulate the model in terms of
sum of lagged disturbance terms such that
xt = ϕ(L)λ0 + ϕ(L)εt,
where L indicates a lag operator and ϕ(L) is the lag polynomial given by





Note that ϕ(L)λ0 = λ0
1−λ1L−λ2L = E(x)a n dϕk = Λk(1,1), i.e., the (1,1) element of the matrix Λk,w h i c hi sa






Here, we approximate the polynomial ϕ(L) by the ninth-order.
The missing value of land share for 1996 is forecasted from the estimated AR(2) model yt below:
yt = ψ0 + ψ1yt−1 + ψ2yt−2 + νt, (66)
where νt is drawn from i.i.d. normal distribution N(0,σν). We use the available time-series sample between
1972 and 1995. The estimates for land share are given in Table A.2. All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant with p-values
less than 0.06.
35Table A.2. Estimated Parameters for AR(2) Model of Land Share
ψ0 ψ1 ψ2 σν
0.0011 1.7993 -0.8176 0.0020
(0.0004) (0.1460) (0.1253) (0.0003)
The quality-adjusted labor index zt shows a clear increasing trend. Thus, we estimate a trend-stationary
model in logarithm of zt:
ln(zt)=δ0 + δ1t + ηt,
where ηt is drawn from i.i.d. normal distribution N(0,ση), using the available sample between 1980 and 1995.
The estimates are given in Table A.3 below. All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant with p-values less than 0.001. The
missing values of the quality-adjusted labor index are ﬁlled at these estimates.
Table A.3. Estimated Parameters for Log-Trend-Stationary Model of Quality-adjusted Labor Index
δ0 δ1 ση R2
-39.550 0.0223 0.0330 0.9112
(3.556) (0.0018)
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Figure A.6. Gamma at 0.0120 